Frank Fukuyama on Liberalism and its Discontents

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The New Fukuyama: Spreading the Blame for Liberalism’s Discontents

Liberalism and Its Discontents

By Francis Fukuyama

Macmillan/May 2022

Reviewed by Colin Robertson

April 26, 2022

Liberalism and its Discontents is a defence of liberalism by Francis Fukuyama, who made the transition from niche political scientist to literary rock star — with all the credit, blame and controversy that provokes — with the publication of his bestseller The End of History and the Last Man in 1992.

In The End of History, Fukuyama famously declared that liberal democracy was the form of human government that best served humanity’s aspirations — a conclusion some players both political and geopolitical have spent the three intervening decades pushing back against. Expanding on an essay he had written in 1989 for The National Interest just prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, it caught the zeitgeist of the end of the Cold War. Subsequent books looked at questions around trust and human nature, development and technology and their relationship to governance.

Posted at the time to our embassy in Washington, I would regularly call on Frank Fukuyama to get his assessment of the state of America, chatting with him in his office at at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on Embassy Row. With George W. Bush in his second term and the war in Iraq having turned sour, Fukuyama thought that Americans could become more isolationist and less idealist and that they wanted ‘less government’ and less ‘adventurism’ abroad. We would continue our conversation after he moved to Stanford. This review also draws from a Zoom call we did for a CGAI Global Exchange podcast.

For much of the past decade, Fukuyama — now Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford — has focused on democracy. He published two magisterial volumes:  The Origins of Political Order: from Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (2011) and Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the the Globalization of Democracy (2014). In 2018, he published Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Now, we have Fukuyama’s defence of liberalism in a slim volume — at 192 pages — whose title is a play on Sigmund Freud’s classic Civilization and Its Discontents.

For Fukuyama, liberalism is the “limitation of the powers of governments through law and ultimately constitutions, creating institutions protecting the rights of individuals living under their jurisdiction.” Liberalism is based on the principles of equality, the rule of law to ensure accountability, and the unalienable rights of individuals to what the Founding Fathers defined in the US Declaration of Independence as ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. It is underpinned by representative government to guarantee liberty while providing order and stability.

Classical liberalism, writes Fukuyama, is a big tent encompassing a range of political views that nonetheless agree on the foundational importance of equal individual rights, law, and freedom. Liberalism became a “pragmatic tool” for resolving conflicts in diverse societies, lowering the temperature of politics by parsing apparently irreconcilable divides over cultural and political issues into component parts and then providing remedies. This often involves addressing particular local circumstances and coming up with fixes that either takes the steam out of the issue or buys times for more measured consideration. Over time, writes Fukuyama, liberalism became more than just a mechanism for pragmatically avoiding violent conflict, but also a means of protecting fundamental human dignity.

But what once was taken for granted is today under severe threat as would-be authoritarians such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Jair Bolsonaro use their electoral mandates to attack democracy, including by undermining the courts and justice system, delegitimizing the press by labeling mainstream media as “enemies of the people”, and corrupting professional bureaucracies and turning them into partisan instruments. It is no accident, writes Fukuyama, that Orbán puts himself forward as a proponent of the oxymoronic model of “illiberal democracy.”

Over time, writes Fukuyama, liberalism became more than just a mechanism for pragmatically avoiding violent conflict, but also a means of protecting fundamental human dignity.

Liberalism and its Discontents takes us from the Greeks, for whom liberalism was ‘nothing in excess’ through the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, democratization in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the neoliberalism of the 1980s and 1990s. Today, says Fukuyama, liberalism faces attacks from enemies abroad and at home as well as from the pernicious effect of social media and a weakened free press.

The autocrats – China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin — offer an alternative authoritarian system based on state enterprise and near-total surveillance aligned to a system of what the Chinese call ‘social credit’ designed to keep the population in check. Both Xi and Putin posit that the West is decadent and in decline, and, as Putin told the Financial Times, liberalism has “become obsolete.”

At home, liberalism faces attacks from both conservatives and progressives. They share a common contempt for liberalism and globalism and an attraction to populism, although from different perspectives. It is to this challenge that Fukuyama devotes his attention.

For the right, liberalism is incompatible with their fixations on nationalism, economic freedom and culture. Fukuyama writes that discontent from the right goes deeper than the ambitions of a handful of populist politicians. They would not be successful were they not riding a wave of discontent with some of the underlying characteristics of our current society especially the feeling of the working class that the system only works for the elite and that their children will be even worse off. Similarely, in trying to rectify past injustices through privileges or entitlements for designated groups, governments create new resentments that are fodder for populists.

For the left, liberalism is an affront to their focus on identity politics and social justice. While the challenge from the left is less direct, Fukuyama warns that it is equally pernicious. He points to the media, the arts and academe as especially susceptible to self or peer-censorship in their writing, speaking and teaching.

To deal with the discontents. Fukuyama offers solutions and hope.

While America’s checks and balances limit the possibility of the kind of reforms desired by young progressives, they also protected the country from attempted abuses of power by Donald Trump.

For pluralistic nations, Fukuyama points to federalism as a proven formula to meet regional, religious and linguistic needs. Voting: the casting, counting, and certification of which is a fundamental right, must be defended. For democratic deliberation and compromise, privacy is a necessary condition if individuals are ever expected to be honest about their views.

Solving inequality depends as much on family and community and access to good health care and education as government intervention. Social policy should be directed at fluid categories such as class rather than fixed ones like race or ethnicity. Inequality in group outcomes, he writes, is a by-product of multiple interacting social and economic factors, many of which are well beyond the ability of policy to correct. Our political leaders, says Fukuyama, have a responsibility to revive public-spiritedness, tolerance, open-mindedness, and active engagement in public affairs.

For those of us troubled by the distemper currently afflicting our politics and public policy, Fukuyama is a necessary read. Restoring trust in government and our public institutions is essential. Somehow, we have got to find our way out of the mean narrowness of the right and the left’s fixation on equality of result over equality of opportunity, as Fukuyama presents it.

Reinvigorating what historian Arthur Schlesinger once called the vital centre will require active civic engagement, new ideas, and perhaps new parties and certainly new leadership. In the meantime, as Fukuyama concludes, we can still learn much from the wisdom of the Greeks and their belief in moderation and nothing in excess. “Moderation is not a bad political principle in general,” he writes, “and especially for a liberal order that was meant to calm political passions from the start.”

Advice both timely and timeless.

Canada and Indo-Pacific

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‘No time to lose’: Indo-Pacific strategy highly anticipated after absence from budget

By NEIL MOSS      APRIL 12, 2022
With the focus on confronting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, little opportunity was left to spotlight Indo-Pacific priorities in the budget.
Some are anticipating Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly to release Canada’s new Indo-Pacific strategy this year. The Hill Times photograph by Andrew Meade

Absent from the latest federal budget were commitments to Indo-Pacific priorities as Canadians await the government’s much-anticipated strategy for engagement in the region.

In the budget tabled on April 7, the Liberal government pledged an additional $8-billion in defence funding and to complete a defence review. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland’s (University-Rosedale, Ont.) comments on the budget’s foreign policy commitments spotlit Ukraine, noting that the rules-based international order is under the “greatest threat since its inception,” and remarking that democracies around the world can only be safe when Russian President Vladimir Putin and his armies are “entirely vanquished.”

Experts on Canada’s engagement with Asia noted that with the attention on Ukraine, they didn’t have an expectation there would be a focus on Indo-Pacific matters.

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The Globe and Mail reported earlier this year that an Indo-Pacific strategy was being circulated at the “top levels of the bureaucracy” and is supported with $3.5-billion over five years.

The development and launch of an Indo-Pacific strategy is highlighted in Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly’s (Ahuntsic-Cartierville, Que.) mandate letter, noting that the strategy has the objectives of deepening “diplomatic, economic, and defence partnerships and international assistance in the region.”

The government has already announced its intent to begin trade negotiations that would seemingly be fundamental to supporting increased trade away from China, including trade talks with Indonesia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and re-engaging with India towards an interim trade pact.

The Canada-China relationship has been beleaguered since Beijing arrested Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in apparent retaliation to Canada’s arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou at the behest of the U.S. in 2018. All three cases have since been resolved. Since then, Canada’s foreign policy attention has shifted to Europe and Ukraine.

International Trade Minister Mary Ng has announced that Canada will embark on trade talks with Indonesia, ASEAN, and India. The Hill Times photograph by Andrew Meade

While a focus on Indo-Pacific priorities is not in the budget, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada president Jeff Nankivell, most recently Canada’s consul general in Hong Kong, said he expects the strategy to be launched this year with the necessary resources announced when it is revealed.

“It’s important to get this done sooner rather than later,” said Nankivell, also a previous deputy head of mission at Canada’s Embassy in China. “It was signalled already a few years ago and it has taken too long to get to this point, so looking ahead, my hope would be that it’s a matter of a few months at most.”

With the shifting nature of geopolitics, he said it’s important for Canada to “step up” its engagement in Asia, including in southeast Asia where he remarked countries can partner on regional security and global issues.

“There’s really no time to lose,” he said.

Nankivell said the fact that Joly is in Indonesia and Vietnam this week amid the situation in Ukraine shows that she is committed to revealing the strategy this year.

“The fact that she is doing this travel this week, the fact that she [was] engaging with ambassadors and high commissioners from countries in Asia last month at a time when there was so many other things going on, I think those are pretty strong signals that the government has not lost its commitment to move on the Indo-Pacific strategy,” he said.

The former diplomat said Canada needs to “raise” its game in the region.

“Countries in the region have seen Canada over the years engage in a kind of sporadic way, but not in a sustained way,” he said. “It should be the aim of having an Indo-Pacific strategy … that we bring more sustained focus and resources to bear on those relationships.”

One of the measures of the strategy’s success, Nankivell said, is to have representatives of Indo-Pacific countries notice a significant change in Canada’s engagement.

He said the greatest opportunities for growth of new economic markets are in the Indo-Pacific.

“Investing in better relationships in the Indo-Pacific region is an investment in prosperity for Canadians because you simply won’t find opportunities on the same scale anywhere else in the world,” he said.

Former Canadian diplomat Philip Calvert, who served as ambassador to Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos from 2012 to 2016, said he wasn’t surprised that there wasn’t a focus in the budget on the Indo-Pacific, given the government has been occupied with the crisis in Europe.

“I think they’ve made the decision that the most immediate threat comes to Canada from Russia,” said Calvert, who has served multiple postings at Canada’s Embassy in Beijing.

With the need for an Indo-Pacific strategy to be attached with funding, he said he expects that it has been pushed aside by Russia.

“Sometimes governments have a tendency to be easily distracted,” he said. “This has thrown them off a bit from their Indo-Pacific plans.”

“It’s unfortunate because it’s taken them a while to get the Indo-Pacific strategy up and running,” he said, noting that there have long been calls for greater predictability for Canada’s future engagement in the region.

He said what is important is for the government to keep the Indo-Pacific strategy in its sights and continue to work on it.

When the strategy is released, Calvert said he hopes it will identify what some of the key challenges are for Canada in Asia and how Canada can build credibility in Asia by looking at issues like climate change.

Canada’s Embassy in Beijing has been without an ambassador since Dominic Barton left last year. The Hill Times photograph by Andrew Meade

Former diplomat Colin Robertson, vice-president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said Canada is in a position as a middle power where it must react to events, instead of being proactive.

“You can only do so much at one time—while [the Indo-Pacific is] important, it wasn’t urgent and immediate in the same sense that Ukraine was,” he said.

Not only is Canada’s attention on confronting Russia, but Ottawa will also likely have a role in the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war is over, he said.

Robertson said he expects the focus of the Indo-Pacific strategy to shift from trade to defence and security.

Former Canadian ambassador to China Guy Saint-Jacques, who served in Beijing from 2012 to 2016, said he was expecting to see more on Indo-Pacific priorities in the budget, but that is encumbered by the need to confront Ukraine and the ongoing debate in Ottawa about the funding that will be tied to an Indo-Pacific strategy.

He said he doesn’t understand why it has taken the government so long to formulate its plan on future engagement with China, noting the delay in its decision on whether to allow Huawei in Canada’s 5G network is also puzzling.

Saint-Jacques suggested that there may be some “complacency” from the government, as Canada-China trade has been strong.

“We need the government to come up with a completely revised engagement strategy that recognizes China is a threat to security, to democracy, and it conducts interference activities in Canada,” he said. “We have to be a lot more proactive and firm with China and push back, but we don’t see any of that.”

He noted that the U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration is also awaiting Canada’s new engagement plan with China and the Indo-Pacific.

Bob Rae at UN

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Canada’s Blunt Talk to Russia at the UN, Spilling With Outrage

On Feb. 24, 2022, Bob Rae, Canada’s ambassador to the UN, says he carries a copy of the UN Charter in his pocket. At the General Assembly session, above, on Ukraine, he said: “Russia and its acolytes can spin and can contort all they want, but the violations of international law are theirs: the loss of life, the wounding, the pain and suffering, are all their responsibilities. As it’s been said, this is President Putin’s choice.” 

TORONTO — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has seriously rattled Europe and the rest of the world and upset the normally sedate discourse of diplomats at the United Nations as well. The public remarks of Canada’s UN ambassador about the war have stood out for their vehemence against Russia and President Vladimir Putin’s claims for a  military incursion against a neighbor.

“Whatever lies are spoken here today trying to justify the unjustifiable or to explain the inexplicable. . . . It is President Putin’s war of choice . . . ” Bob Rae, Canada’s envoy, said on Feb. 28 in an emergency special session in the General Assembly on Ukraine, four days after Russia began attacking its neighbor.

Rae’s frank talk and hashtag diplomacy are getting noticed in a profession where talk is more often subtle than confrontational. With a Twitter-handle tip of the hat to his year of birth, Canada’s envoy, @BobRae48, currently has about 173,000 followers — friends and foes alike. He describes himself as “ambassador, writer, teacher” and that his tweets express his “personal views.”

On March 21, in response to a tweet by Volodymyr Artiukh, an academic researcher, about “the focus on NATO expansion,” in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Rae wrote: “This blaming of the current crisis on NATO and the West has to be put to sleep. This has been about Putin’s drive to restore empire, tyranny and dominance, and to block freedom and sovereignty. He is Stalin’s horrendous successor.”

For those who have followed his career, Rae’s outspokenness is entirely in character. He is described as a man who understands the power of words, knows what is at stake and is determined for Canada to champion human rights. He uses Twitter to amplify Canada’s voice at the UN, calling out nations and their leaders who defy the UN Charter, of which a worn copy that belonged to his father, a former envoy, is always in his pocket, he says.

Indeed, Rae, 73, learned the art of diplomacy and debate from his father. Saul Rae was a career Canadian diplomat who served as ambassador to the UN in Geneva (1962-1967) and New York City (1972-1976)

He is known in Toronto social and political circles for his lightness and sense of humor and love of music. Rae plays the piano and composes songs for his wife, Arlene Perly Rae, each year on their wedding anniversary. (She is pictured with Rae on his Twitter page.) He dabbles in poetry and has written four books reflecting on the state of politics, democracy and the public good.

A recipient of a Rhodes scholarship and a lawyer, many people describe Rae as the smartest man in the room. A pragmatic politician, Rae moved back and forth from federal to provincial politics, from the center-leaning Liberal Party to the left-of-center New Democratic Party (NDP). In 1990, he was sworn in as the first, and so far, only NDP premier of Ontario, Canada’s most populous province. His premiership ended with a crushing electoral defeat five years later, and he returned to Ottawa and the Liberal Party in 2006.

He ran twice for the leadership of the federal Liberals, but lost both times, and finally served as the interim party leader from 2011, until Justin Trudeau’s election in 2013 as prime minister. Rae left politics after that.

Julian Porter, a prominent Canadian lawyer and a close friend who has breakfast (virtually) with Rae most Tuesday mornings, ascribes his astute oratorial skills to the early days as a member of Parliament in Ottawa for the New Democrats. Representing a small party with few seats and little influence, he quickly learned the art of being heard on the floor in Canada’s House of Commons.

In his own work, Rae has described Canada’s tenuous influence on the world stage, particularly at the UN. Years before he was appointed Canada’s ambassador to the world body in 2020, Rae wrote about his country’s value to the UN in his 2015 book, “What’s Happened to Politics?.”

“As a country that is less than a superpower, Canada cannot rely on its muscle to make itself heard,” he wrote. “Our influence comes from a capacity for wisdom, from being a trusted source of information, knowledge and judgment on some of the most difficult issues facing the world.”

In a March 16 Politico interview, he was asked if he was satisfied with the amount of discourse at the UN in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Rae replied, “There is always lots of discourse at the UN. The question is: Is the discourse related to reality? Is it related to the ability to take action?”

Trusted by Prime Minister Trudeau and Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland (who has Ukrainian roots), Rae’s outrage at Russia’s actions in Ukraine resonates with Canadians. Those who know him well professionally and personally say that he speaks from the heart. Trudeau appointed him to the UN post.

“There may be people looking askance at the Canadian ambassador’s outspoken comments,” said Guillermo Rishchynski, a former Canadian envoy to the UN.

“Nevertheless, Rae’s leadership shows Canada well,” he added. “We have been defeated twice for a seat on the Security Council. Leading with our chin on this can only help Canada.” (Canada lost a three-way race for two Security Council seats, defeated by Norway and Ireland, in 2020, leaving the country stung by its second failure in a decade to gain a spot in the chamber.)

Canada’s diplomatic corps is acutely aware that Twitter can also be a platform for unforced errors. In 2018, Freeland called out Saudi Arabia on Twitter for unjustly imprisoning human rights advocates. The Saudis swiftly expelled Canada’s ambassador and cut trade.

“It was an expensive tweet for Canada. The lesson is that there is no nuance on Twitter,” said Colin Robertson, a former Canadian diplomat and fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, a nonpartisan research institute based in Calgary.

Not one for nuance, and responding to the lack of allied support for Canada in the spat with Saudi Arabia, Rae posted on Twitter on Aug. 7, 2018: “The Brits and the Trumpians run for cover and say ‘we’re friends with both the Saudis and the Canadians.’ Thanks for the support for human rights, guys, and we’ll remember this one for sure.”

In a recent CBC interview, Rae said of Russia’s leaders, “We know they are lying because their lips are moving.” He also posted those remarks on Twitter.

In his 2015 book “What’s Happened to Politics?,” he wrote about a study of propaganda in WWI, called “The First Casualty,” referring to the idea that truth is the first thing discarded by all sides as they attempt to influence public opinion.

While Rishchynski sees Rae’s wit and outrage at Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as fit for the moment, not everyone agrees. Several diplomats have said privately in interviews for this article that they fear Rae’s frank-talking undermines Canada’s ability to play a meaningful role in peacekeeping and humanitarian spaces at the UN.

On the evening of Feb. 23 in New York City, as Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in Europe in the morning of Feb. 24, Rae reposted a PassBlue tweet with a photo of Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia presiding over a late-night emergency session of the Security Council on Ukraine, with the caption, “Criminals and apologists for criminals.”

As some members of the Security Council had requested an emergency session to push for peace for Ukraine, Russia announced, numerous time zones away, that it was invading the country.

Even longstanding admirers disagree with Rae’s bluntness on Russia’s assault on Ukraine. “If you want a cease-fire or to de-escalate, is it wise to threaten Putin with war crimes or genocide?” said John Packer, associate professor of law and the Neuberger-Jesin Professor of International Conflict Resolution at the University of Ottawa. “All are applicable, but what is the point of saying it? The art of diplomacy is to obtain the change of behavior you seek when you have no ability to force that change.”

Rae is not backing down, however. Addressing fellow UN General Assembly members regarding a recent South African-led proposed resolution focusing on the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine that omitted references to Russia’s aggression, Rae said:

“A humanitarian crisis of this type is not a spontaneous event. It is the direct result of a deliberate decision by one country, the Russian Federation, to invade another, Ukraine. We cannot be expected to discuss Moby Dick without talking about the whale.” (The resolution was never taken to a vote.)

His Twitter following keeps growing: @BobRae48 added 2,000 new followers between March 24 and 27.

Suzanne Courtney
Susanne Courtney

Susanne Courtney is a freelance journalist and writer based in Canada. A former fellow in global journalism at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy in Toronto, her writing focuses primarily on international affairs, international development and development finance. Recently, she wrote the 2021 State of the Sector Report on Canada’s Impact Investing in Emerging and Frontier Markets.

Time for CD Howe

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To truly support our allies, Canada needs a C.D. Howe moment

RONA AMBROSE, FRANK MCKENNA AND COLIN ROBERTSON

Globe and Mail March 19,2022

Rona Ambrose is the chair of the Women’s Economic Council of Canada and a former leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. Frank McKenna is a former New Brunswick premier and Canadian ambassador to the United States. Colin Robertson is a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and a former diplomat.

The invasion of Ukraine has brought in its wake not just the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War, but also a global food security crisis and profound disruption of energy markets. Canada is uniquely positioned to help, but it will require the kind of effort we mustered all those decades ago.

The immediate challenge posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine is meeting the energy crisis imposed by the necessary sanctions on Russian oil and gas: Russia is the world’s largest exporter of oil to global markets, and its gas exports account for close to 40 per cent of the European Union’s consumption. The invasion has also created the biggest commodity crisis since 1973, and, in the case of wheat, a level of disruption that has not been seen since the First World War. To adjust, Europeans have had to make dramatic changes to the status quo that would have been unimaginable just three weeks ago.

This courageous effort, and the heroic sacrifices of the Ukrainian people, must be matched by a herculean effort by allies around the world to supply the war effort. And so Canada – endowed as we are with an abundance of food and energy – cannot respond as if things are business as usual. We have already opened our doors to the displaced, but we also have the oil and gas Europe needs and, like Ukraine, we are a breadbasket to the world. Canada must be part of the solution to help our friends and allies. Throwing up our hands wasn’t an option in 1939 – and is not an option now.

Harnessing our natural resources to do so, including oil and gas, hydroelectricity, uranium and critical minerals, requires a strategic approach. It starts with an inventory of infrastructure requirements – electrical grids, pipelines, rail, road and port capacities – then identifying their vulnerabilities and how to fix them. Canada also needs to take such an approach to our agri-food resources. We need to inventory what our farmers, ranchers, fishers and food processors need to ramp up production, and resolve any choke points in getting our food to markets.

We will also need dynamic leadership. For inspiration, look at how Canada helped win the Second World War. Like never before, Canadian industry and government worked together under the direction of the redoubtable C. D. Howe, who the Canadian Encyclopedia aptly describes as the “most successful businessman-politician of his day.”

In those years, Canada became a vital link in keeping Britain alive with our supply of food, oil and armaments. We built ships and trained pilots. If the U.S. was, as Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared, “the great arsenal of democracy,” Canada was the aerodrome. In securing vital sea lanes in the long Battle of the North Atlantic, our navy had the fourth-largest fleet in the world by the war’s end.

Once more, Canada needs to step up and put our economic assets on a war footing. In short, we need a C.D. Howe moment.

A good start would be the appointment of a minister with the authorities of a Howe – someone who can work closely with industry and labour across the areas of energy, agri-food and defence with the goal of cutting through red tape and executing a plan to rebuild our military while fuelling and feeding our allies.

We need dynamic leadership that will work across party lines and provincial boundaries. We need a bulldozer to plow through the thicket of bureaucracy and regulations that make it so hard to get things done in Canada.

This may seem impossible, but the same was said before the Second World War. That conflict should teach us that nothing is impossible when life and liberty are in the balance. We must defang Russia and any other malevolent country that wants to use its commodity hegemony to hold the world at ransom.

The rules-based world as we knew it is gone. The institutions that we helped build and sustain are no longer fit for purpose. Canada now needs to roll up its sleeves and join in reconstructing a rules-based order for the democracies.

In the struggle between autocracy and democracy, Canadians know where they stand. We expect our governments to rise to the challenge and help our allies. It starts with feeding and fuelling our friends and allies.

Interview with Shaye Ganam on the oped

After the horrors of Ukraine, Canada should aim to be a major player in helping the world meet its future food needs

By DAVID CRANE       MARCH 28, 2022
From a long-term perspective, Canada should work to raise its potential as a sustainable global food supplier— especially for developing countries that are major importers of food and, with ongoing climate warming and weather shocks, face growing threats to their own agricultural capacity.

TORONTO—The Russian invasion of Ukraine is triggering many responses in Canada, including calls for more aid to Ukraine, tougher sanctions against Russia, accelerated welcoming of displaced Ukrainian families, dramatic new defence spending and ways for our oil industry to profit.

Some of these responses make great humanitarian and pragmatic sense—such as speeding up the entry of displaced families, directing more help to Ukraine, and contributing to world food needs. But some, despite coming from reputable individuals, are so extreme or misguided one has to wonder why they were made.

Perhaps the strangest proposal came from Rona Ambrose, former interim leader of the Conservative Party; Frank McKenna, former New Brunswick premier and our ambassador to the United States; and former diplomat Colin Robertson, all well-experienced individuals with serious accomplishments, that Canada put itself on a full-scale war footing.

Conjuring up pictures of brave Canadian naval convoys ploughing the treacherous North Atlantic during World War II to deliver supplies to a beleaguered Britain, they called for the quick appointment of a war minister with draconian powers—C.D. Howe—so that, as in World War II, we can “feed and fuel” our allies while expanding our national defence capabilities and put our economic assets—energy and food in particular—“on a war footing.”

There clearly are things we can do to help the world cope with the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the widespread consequences of sanctions. But, without denying the horrors of what’s happening in Ukraine, this doesn’t need to be dressed up in wartime hysteria as though Europe was reliving World War II. This is a time for cool heads, not hot heads.

In fact, aside from important, ongoing aid to Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, the most useful things we can do will not be in Europe or the United States, but in the developing world, which may end up paying the highest price for anti-Russian sanctions. It is the developing world, and especially in the poorest of the poor countries which will have the most serious difficulty coping with soaring energy and food prices, and, in the case of food, even finding adequate supplies. They will have an urgent need for increased foreign aid. Food shortages, for example, can lead to humanitarian disasters and food riots, with serious political implications across regions, as we have seen before in North Africa and the Middle East. Egypt has already turned to the International Monetary Fund for help.

There are opportunistic calls from the oil patch and its supporters to get our oil and gas to the U.S. and Europe to replace Russian sources. But the reality is that the U.S. can cope and Europe has other options. For example, Saudi Arabia has already announced it will spend heavily to boost oil production and Germany has unveiled a long-term supply contract with Qatar for liquified natural gas. Meanwhile, Europe will be accelerating its transition to a low-carbon economy, steadily reducing oil and gas consumption.

Food is where we can make a much better contribution, and mainly for the food-deficient countries of the developing world, not the U.S. or Europe. Paradoxically, the more we push oil output, the more we threaten future food production. Climate change is already raising the prevalence of drought, which poses a major threat to our capacity to produce food, and risks of drought are expected to intensify. With harsh drought conditions in Western Canada last year, wheat production fell 39 per cent and canola production 35 per cent. Early signs are for continuing dry conditions this year.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is already having a serious impact, triggering record-high grain prices earlier this month. Russia is the world’s largest wheat supplier and Ukraine is the fifth largest. Together, they supply about 25 per cent of world wheat exports. Barring weather shocks, and assuming no effort by the West to block Russian wheat exports, Russia should be a major supplier again this year. But Ukraine is unlikely to be, since it is far from certain it can harvest this summer or plant for next year.

Some countries depend heavily on wheat imports and in large measure from Russia and Ukraine. Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, followed by Indonesia and Bangladesh. But many food-deficient countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia are reliant on Russia and Ukraine for wheat and vegetable oils such as canola. Canada, Australia, and the United States can make up for some of the expected deficiency but not all. Many countries, including Canada, also rely on Russia for fertilizer supplies and these have been curbed by sanctions. To the extent it can boost food exports, Canada should give priority to countries facing humanitarian disasters.

From a long-term perspective, Canada should work to raise its potential as a sustainable global food supplier— especially for developing countries that are major importers of food and, with ongoing climate warming and weather shocks, face growing threats to their own agricultural capacity.

This also means making agriculture a more significant part of Canada’s innovation agenda. The combination of a rising world population, the existing and future threats from climate change, the major risks to global water supplies, and the deterioration and loss of healthy soils all mean that we have to pay much more attention to sustainable food production and the science of food production.

Right now, our eyes are fixed on the horrors of events in Ukraine, as they should be. But coming out of this crisis, as we will, we should focus on what’s next. For Canada, this means, we need to aim to be a major and reliable future player in helping the world meet its future food needs.

In the longer term, food and agriculture should be a growing industry for Canada while we, at the same time, must accept that oil and gas will become a shrinking industry.

David Crane can be reached At crane@interlog.com.

 

New Diplomacy

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Canada’s UN mission goes viral with tweet mocking Russian letter to United NationsRussia fired back, accusing Canada of ‘kindergarten-level Russophobic libel’

Maya Lach-Aidelbaum · CBC News · 

In an unorthodox diplomatic move, Canada’s UN mission on Thursday tweeted out a heavily annotated letter that Russia had sent to the United Nations, including pointed comments in the rewrite, later prompting Russian accusations of “kindergarten-level libel.”

In a tweet that quickly went viral, Canada’s UN mission added multiple remarks to a March 16 letter from Russia’s UN ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia. The missive sought support for Russia’s draft resolution on providing aid access and civilian protection in Ukraine.

Canada’s UN mission annotated one part of the Russian letter that read: “Like other members of the international community, we are gravely concerned about its deterioration,” referring to the “dire humanitarian situation in and around Ukraine.”

Canada’s UN mission crossed out the first few words and changed the rest to read: “We are not gravely concerned about its deterioration,” and inserted at the end “because we are the primary cause.”

In a section a few sentences below that, Canada’s UN mission added a comment asking: “Do you think the UN membership actually believes this?” where Nebenzia accuses “Western colleagues” of “politicizing humanitarian issue [sic].”

On the final page, Canada suggested part of an alternative ending: “We want you to know just how little we care about the human life we have destroyed.”

Lama Khodr, a media spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada, said the tweet was published “to contribute to Canada’s public diplomacy on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to provide transparency on the disinformation being spread by the Russian mission to the UN.”

Russia can’t negotiate in good faith while targeting Ukrainian civilians: Joly

1 day ago

Duration11:58

Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly says she doesn’t trust Russia to negotiate peace with Ukraine in good faith while its military is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity on the ground. 11:58

Anthony Hinton, political co-ordinator at Canada’s UN mission, went to Twitter on Thursday to explain how the tweet was created.

“This was done in-house by a creative member of the team, who is responsible for protecting civilians,” he said.

“Took 30 mins. Only 1 draft then published. No back & forth with HQ. Aim: transparency for this blatant Russian disinfo, which they sent to all UN members.”

Countries around the world, including Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Estonia, have commended Canada’s tweet.

Dmitry Polyanskiy, first deputy permanent representative of Russia to the United Nations, fired back on Thursday:

“Thank you @CanadaONU for this kindergarten-level Russophobic libel!” he wrote on Twitter.

“It only shows that your diplomatic skills and good manners are at lowest ebb and gives an idea why your country’s bid for a non-permanent seat in #SecurityCouncil was voted down twice in 20yrs by UN membership,” Polyanskiy said, adding a thumbs-down emoji.

Tweet ‘unconventional’ but ‘effective’: expert

Colin Robertson, a former Canadian diplomat and fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, says Canada’s tweet demonstrates “effective diplomacy.”

“It’s unconventional, but we are living in unconventional times,” Robertson said.

He said traditional diplomacy, which tends to happen behind closed doors and is kept out of the public eye, isn’t as effective in today’s information-rich times, where social media has increased people’s expectations for transparency.

In order to maintain public support, Robertson says it’s in governments’ best interest to make information public early on.

“I think diplomacy is going to have to change if it’s going to sustain the public support that is necessary for democracies to be able to act together,” Robertson said. “Because when you go to war, you have to have the support of your public.”

Robertson noted a shift in diplomacy strategy earlier on in the Russia-Ukraine conflict when Western officials shared intelligence on Russia’s imminent invasion publicly, something that he said would not have happened in the past.

On Feb. 21, days before Russia began its wide-ranging invasion of Ukraine, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Russian forces were preparing to launch an attack against Ukraine and laid out detailed intelligence about how Russia would do it.

Blinken said Russia ‘plans to manufacture a pretext’ for an attack on Ukraine. 3:54

But Robertson said Twitter diplomacy has backfired in the past, such as when Global Affairs Canada publicly called out Saudi Arabia on Twitter in 2018 for arresting activists and demanded their release.

After the tweet was published, Saudi Arabia ordered Canada’s ambassador to leave the country and froze all new trade and investment transactions with Canada.

“I think the problem with tweets is that there’s no nuance and, normally, diplomacy is nuanced,” Robertson said.

But he said in this case, the tweet condemning Russia’s actions in the letter provides quite a bit of nuance because it includes the original Russian letter and detailed comments explaining Canada’s position.

Better an also ran than not at all

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The top 50 influencing Canadian foreign policy

Politicians

  • Justin Trudeau, prime minister
  • Chrystia Freeland, deputy prime minister and finance minister
  • Mélanie Joly, foreign affairs minister
  • Anita Anand, defence minister
  • Mary Ng, international trade minister
  • Marco Mendicino, public safety minister
  • François-Philippe Champagne, innovation, science, and industry minister
  • Omar Alghabra, transport minister
  • Harjit Sajjan, international development minister
  • Karina Gould, families, children, and social development minister
  • Michael Chong, Conservative foreign affairs critic
  • Hassan Yussuff, Independent Senator

Political staffers

  • Katie Telford, PMO chief of staff
  • Brian Clow, PMO deputy chief of staff
  • Patrick Travers, PMO senior global affairs policy adviser
  • Oz Jungic, PMO policy adviser
  • Elise Wagner, PMO policy adviser for Canada-U.S. relations and issues management
  • Jeremy Broadhurst, PMO senior adviser
  • Sandra Aubé, chief of staff to the foreign affairs minister
  • Chantal Gagnon, deputy chief of staff to the foreign affairs minister
  • Jason Easton, chief of staff to the international trade minister
  • Jillian White, policy director to the international trade minister

Civil Servants

  • Dan Costello, foreign and defence policy adviser to the prime minister
  • David Morrison, deputy minister for international trade and G7 sherpa
  • Jody Thomas, national security and intelligence adviser to the prime minister
  • Marta Morgan, deputy minister of foreign affairs
  • Janice Charette, clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet
  • Bill Matthews, deputy minister of national defence
  • Wayne Eyre, chief of the defence staff
  • Steve Verheul, special adviser to the deputy minister of finance
  • John Hannaford, deputy minister of natural resources
  • David Vigneault, CSIS director

Diplomats

  • Kirsten Hillman, ambassador to the United States
  • Bob Rae, ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations
  • Ailish Campbell, ambassador to the European Union
  • Ralph Goodale, high commissioner to the United Kingdom
  • Larisa Galadza, ambassador to Ukraine
  • Jacqueline O’Neill, ambassador for Women, Peace, and Security
  • David Cohen, U.S. ambassador to Canada
  • Susannah Goshko, U.K. high commissioner to Canada
  • Sabine Sparwasser, German ambassador to Canada

Civil society and others

  • Maryscott Greenwood, CEO of Canadian American Business Council
  • Flavio Volpe, president of Automotive Parts Manufacturers Association
  • Alexandra Chyczij/Ihor Michalchyshyn, president and CEO of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress
  • Irwin Cotler, former Liberal cabinet minister and human rights advocate
  • Frédéric Mérand/Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, academics
  • Thomas Juneau, academic
  • Robert Fife/Steven Chase, Globe and Mail reporters
  • Mark MacKinnon, Globe and Mail international correspondent
  • Alex Panetta/Katie Simpson, CBC reporters

    Honourable mentions 

    • Bill Blair, emergency preparedness minister
    • Sean Fraser, immigration minister
    • Robert Oliphant, parliamentary secretary to the foreign affairs minister
    • Jonathan Fried, former diplomat
    • Louise Blais, former diplomat
    • Colin Robertson, former diplomat
    • Roland Paris, academic and former PMO foreign policy adviser
    • Shelly Bruce, Communications Security Establishment chief
    • Ratna Omidvar, Independent Senator
    • Goldy Hyder, Business Council of Canada president

    nmoss@hilltimes.com

Ukraine and the Democracies

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The democracies need to push back hard

Unless the democracies stand up — and stand together — there will be more Ukraines

Colin Robertson,  Special to Financial Post Mar 01, 2022

Our fraying rules-based international order is in danger of unravelling completely. Might makes right is enjoying a come-back. Unless the democracies stand up — and stand together — there will be more Ukraines. Democracy, under assault at home and from outside, is on the line. For Canada, standing up means we need to increase our defence and security premiums and, in concert with our democratic allies, rethink our global strategy

Bob Rae, our ambassador to the United Nations, got it right when he tweeted that Vladimir Putin is a “war criminal” and that “every possible assistance must be provided the people and government of Ukraine.” For now, that will mean money and equipment, including arms, to the Ukrainian patriots resisting Russian aggression, as well as humanitarian aid through the Red Cross and other organizations for the victims of the war, especially the displaced within Ukraine. We also need to open our doors to those who do not want to live under the Russian yoke.

After the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Canada was the first western nation to recognize Ukrainian independence. The ties of history and family are strong, especially in western Canada, with over 1.4 million Canadians claiming Ukrainian roots. Canadian governments, both Conservative and Liberal, have actively supported initiatives to grow and strengthen Ukrainian governance and, since 2015, to help train Ukraine’s armed forces.

The great strength of democracies is our fundamental belief in norms of fairness and decency. But Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping have never shared these values. A democratic and prosperous Taiwan and a Ukraine moving in that direction disprove their claim that autocracy is superior to democracy. And let’s not delude ourselves, if Putin gets away with Ukraine, Xi will soon swallow Taiwan.

The weakness of the West is our failure to robustly defend our values. But push back we must and so the next tranche of sanctions must bite not just the personal pocketbooks of President Putin, his cronies and kleptocratic entourage, but their passports as well. Why should they and their families enjoy their mansions in London, study at Harvard or skiing in the Rockies?

The West also needs to continue beefing up its deterrence through NATO’s collective security alliance. At their Wales summit in 2014 the allies each pledged to commit two per cent of their GDP to defence spending by 2024. Canada currently spends just 1.39 per cent, which means we are outpaced by all our NATO G7 partners: the United States (3.52 per cent), the United Kingdom (2.29), France (2.01), Germany (1.53, and rising to at least 2.0, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in the wake of the Russian invasion), and Italy (1.41).

Our habit of seeing the world as we would like it to be is no longer sustainable. As John F. Kennedy put it, “only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.” Surrounded by three oceans, and with the Russians and Chinese now active in the Arctic, we need a deployable, combat-capable Navy with destroyers, frigates, submarines, and attendant air and logistical support.

In addition to the ongoing disinformation and cyberattacks, Putin may decide to counter western sanctions by cutting off the Russian energy supplies to which our European allies, especially Germany, are addicted. Canada and the United States need to help out by ramping up production and getting tankers across the Atlantic (another reason we need more Navy). In the longer term, as a matter of national security, we need gas pipelines to both coasts and the LNG terminals that complement them.

As of last week, we live in a much messier and meaner world. The defining struggle going forward is between democracy and autocracy. Checks on abuse of power and human rights violations have eroded. Democracy is on the back foot. Freedom House reports 16 consecutive years of decline in global freedom, with fully 38 per cent of the world’s population living in “not free” countries, 42 per cent in only “partly free” countries and just 20 per cent — only one in five people on the planet — in “free” countrie

No democracy is perfect, but Canada’s is clearly in the top tier. We can share our experience, especially in managing pluralism, which is increasingly important in an age where tribalism and identity politics are on the rise. The Trudeau government needs to move now on its long-promised initiative to help advance “peace, order and good government.”

In the decades after World War II, the United Nations promoted the notion of fundamental rights. Canadian John Humphrey was instrumental in drafting the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During the Cold War the democracies actively advanced, albeit imperfectly, the cause of liberty and representative institutions in their domestic and foreign policies. It was all part and parcel of the larger effort to create an open, rules-based international system built on shared resistance to totalitarianism.

The system worked so well that we have enjoyed a remarkable period of peace and prosperity. But complacency set in. We are now called on once again to redeem and reinforce the norms and rules that ensure our democratic values and protect our way of life.

Aftershocks by Thomas Wright

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‘Aftershocks’: The Pandemic as New World Order Force Multiplier

 

Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order

Macmillan/September 2021

By Colin Kahl and Thomas Wright

Reviewed by Colin Robertson

February 20, 2021

History on the hoof can be treacherous but Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order by scholars Colin Kahl and Thomas Wright stands up. What would happen in a global crisis, they ask, if world politics were dominated by national governments that refused, or were unable, to cooperate with one another? Well, we found out and it was a disaster with the global death toll now approaching six million. An intercontinental war is no longer required to accelerate a global contagion.

Aftershock is the story of how our highly interconnected world floundered in what quickly became individual national efforts to cope with a global contagion in an age of gross inequality, rising populism and nationalism, and escalating geopolitical competition especially between the US and China. All of this complicated and ultimately confounded what should have been a coordinated international response.

The authors’ perspective is rooted in history. Indeed, the first chapters of this four- part book are devoted to previous pandemics, especially that of 1918-20 and its effect on world order. The subsequent parts deal with the crisis unleashed by the COVID pandemic, using case studies to illustrate the various disjointed national responses.

Kahl and Wright explore our current world disorder as nations locked down and vaccine nationalism became the order of the day. Illiberal leaders and autocrats took advantage to consolidate power and game elections. Ironically, their efforts to further erode their citizens’ freedoms, and crack down on dissent were aided by new digital technologies, including surveillance apps developed to stop the spread of the virus.

The pandemic has also been characterized by clashes between democratic leaders who wanted to control the outbreak and new world order populists who denied its severity. The net effect, Kahl and Wright argue, has been to reverse decades of poverty reduction in the developing world and erode democracy and civil liberties. The net result, the authors conclude, is probably a fatal blow to our rules-based order.

Kahl and Wright explore our current world disorder as nations locked down and vaccine nationalism became the order of the day.

The final section looks to a post-COVID world, the requirement for pandemic preparedness in vaccines and protective equipment. Kahl and Wright suggest like-minded nations create their own institution but global problems like pandemics and climate change are better addressed through global effort.

Aftershocks is also important because Colin Kahl is now US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and,as such, principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for defense policy. Kahl previously served as Deputy National Security Advisor in the Obama administration.  Thomas Wright directs the Center for the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. Aftershocks is in many ways a companion to his earlier and excellent All Measures Short of War: The Contest For the 21st Century and the Future of America.

Kahl and Wright argue that the pandemic is an unnecessary and, as we are learning, unfinished tragedy. In the case of the United States, they are scathing in their assessment that “there simply was no excuse for one of the world’s most powerful nations to be ranked the fourteenth-worst among all countries for deaths as a percentage of the population.”

From the time he first heard of the dangers posed by the virus, Donald Trump’s response was to misrepresent the threat and its remedies because it interfered with his re-election bid and his efforts to portray himself as the dealmaker-in-chief of his now stillborn China trade pact.

History may not repeat itself but the lessons of the 1918-20 pandemic and the more recent bouts with SARS, MERS and Ebola that make up the first part of the book should have left the West, including Canada, better prepared. Everyone had known some sort of global pandemic was possible. Some countries had even planned for it, but when it arrived, most leaders “were flying blind”.

Around the world, a “competitive, self-help logic” dominated national responses. Shipments promised to other nations were diverted with “sauve qui peut” as the dominant leitmotif. It was not helped by viral disinformation and conspiracy theories, courtesy of new technologies and willing accomplices, including Big Tech.

The main villain in this story is the Chinese Communist Party, which covered up the virus, failing to share vital data and actively repressing doctors and journalists who tried to alert the public. The reforms inspired by SARS were largely swept aside as the country’s medical authorities were sidelined. Instead, China’s leadership contrasted their success in containing the virus with the West’s incapacity.

Beijing’s disinformation campaign against the West included the claim that the virus came to China from the United States. They also cast doubt on American-made vaccines. Using the offer of pandemic assistance to advance their geopolitical interests in Europe, Africa, and Latin America was another demonstration of the claimed superiority of their governance model.

The main villain in this story is the Chinese Communist Party, which covered up the virus, failing to share vital data and actively repressing doctors and journalists who tried to alert the public.

The World Health Organization has still to determine the origin of the virus but discounting a leak from the Wuhan laboratory would be a mistake. Hopes that China would become a responsible stakeholder in the global order have been dashed by Xi Jinping’s repression policies at home and bullying abroad.

The dupe in this tale is the WHO and its director general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. In contrast to his predecessor, Gro Bruntdland, who took on the Chinese during SARS, Tedros bent over backwards to appease Chinese sensitivities. But two years later, the WHO has never been able to get what it wanted from Chinese authorities, who continue to obfuscate, deny and deflect. The pandemic demonstrated that the WHO is not fit for purpose and throughout the crisis failed to offer coherent advice on how to contain it.

Canadian policy-makers need to wake-up. The pandemic exposed the vulnerability of global supply chains as Canadians ruefully learned when flights sent to China for PPE supplies returned home empty. Shortages of critical medical supplies mean governments must put a premium on reliability and redundancy. Re-establishing dependable vaccine production is essential.

For Canada, this means a hard-nosed assessment of our interests and capacities. It will require more investment in defence and security. Not just the warships and fighter jets but cyber-security of our hard and soft infrastructure – satellites, grids, pipelines and data. We need reliable and redundant sources for masks, medicines and vaccines. We should look to the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief and its youth corps of volunteers to complement the burden we put on the Canadian Armed Forces.

Aftershocks makes a compelling case that the pandemic marks the end of an American-led international order where the United States and its democratic allies automatically had the upper hand in international institutions. Biden’s best intentions notwithstanding, the old order is not restored simply because Trump is no longer in the White House.

We must prepare for a world in which we are increasingly hit by global shocks against a backdrop of great-power rivalry. The liberal democracies need to pool resources and move on reform of critical organizations like the WHO. We can expect resistance from China and Russia. Nor can we assume that the USA, subsumed with its domestic travails and the China challenge, will lead. Instead, faced with frustrations at home, it may well revert to what Adam Tooze calls “privileged detachment”. The economic and security implications for Canada will be especially profound.

Looking forward, cooperation on transnational challenges, like pandemics and climate, will no longer be insulated from great-power rivalry. The lingering aftershocks of the pandemic will continue to weaken states and regions. We can expect new problems — conflict and disease, displaced people and refugees — that will further fragment the global order.

Since Aftershocks was published, nations came together at COP26 and the World Health Assembly. Both demonstrated that multilateralism is the route to solving the global challenges posed by climate change and pandemics. But they also demonstrate that an accord is not possible without buy-in from the great powers. It underlines why middle powers like Canada need to double-down on quiet diplomacy and being helpful fixer and bridge builder, while avoiding the temptation toward self-righteousness.

Aftershocks is a grim but necessary read. Middle powers such Canada need to take heed and prepare accordingly.

 

Putin, Ukraine and Canada

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For Russia, invasion would come with a heavy cost. So what’s Moscow’s endgame?

Murray Brewster · CBC News ·
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks to German Chancellor Olaf Scholz during talks in the Kremlin in Moscow on Tuesday. (Mikhail Klimentyev/The Associated Press)

As the threat of an invasion of Ukraine again appeared to slip into a holding pattern, Western leaders and diplomats were left scrambling Tuesday to interpret conflicting signals coming out of Moscow.

Famously described by Britain’s wartime prime minister Winston Churchill as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma,” Russia put its willingness to play by its own rules on full display with a token withdrawal of some troops exercising in Crimea and the offer of renewed security dialogue with the West.

Russia made those gestures after several days of delivering sharp anti-Western rhetoric — and after allied intelligence sources warned again that an invasion could happen as early as today.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed out that — notwithstanding the messages coming from the Kremlin — Russia still has more than 100,000 combat-ready forces poised on Ukraine’s border.

“There are signs from Moscow that diplomacy should continue. This gives grounds for cautious optimism,” Stoltenberg said ahead of a meeting of the Western alliance’s defence ministers.

“But so far, we have not seen any sign of de-escalation on the ground.”

In this photo taken from video provided by the Russian Defence Ministry Press Service on Tuesday, Russian armoured vehicles are loaded onto railway platforms after the end of military drills in South Russia. (Russian Defence Ministry Press Service/The Associated Press)

Over the past several months, NATO has seen Russia move troops and equipment into the region, move them out while leaving their equipment behind — then move them back in just as quickly.

“So the movement of forces, the movement of Russian capabilities doesn’t represent real de-escalation, but we will monitor, we will follow what they are doing,” Stoltenberg said.

Following the movements of the Russian military may be the easiest part of figuring out where this crisis goes next.

President of Finland Sauli Niinisto recently sat for an interview with the New York Times about his enduring dialogue with Vladimir Putin. He told the Times he noted a change in the Russian president’s “state of mind, decisiveness” during a recent long conversation. He said he believed Putin felt he had to seize on “the momentum he has now.”

Haunted by the Soviet Union’s fall

That sort of nuance is missing from the political and diplomatic calculus of the West, said veteran Canadian diplomat Colin Robertson.

“It comes down to Putin because he has a view of history that sees the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century being the dissolution of the Soviet Union,” said Robertson, a vice-president at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

“And I think, before he leaves, he’s determined to restore as much of that as he can. He’s in his late 60s now and I think he’s determined to do it before he leaves — bring Ukraine back into Russia by force, if necessary, preferably by bluff.”

WATCH | In Russia-Ukraine crisis, the threat of an invasion remains high:

Russia’s claims of troop withdrawal are unverified, U.S. says

22 hours ago

Duration 2:02
Russia released video of some troops moving away from the border with Ukraine, but the U.S. says it hasn’t been verified and the threat of an invasion remains high. 2:02

Russia’s parliament, the Duma, attempted to further dismantle Ukraine on Tuesday by voting in favour of a motion calling on Putin to recognize as independent republics the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where Russian proxy forces have been fighting Ukrainian soldiers.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry responded sharply, saying that if Putin supports the resolution, “it will have much broader, destructive consequences for the international rule of law” and global security.

‘Sacred soil’

Matthew Schmidt is an associate professor and national security expert at the University of New Haven in Connecticut. He said the emphasis NATO allies place on geopolitics and the rules-based international order may mean very little to Putin — who may be looking at the current standoff through a quasi-religious lens.

It’s not enough, Schmidt said, to say Putin wants to reassemble the old Soviet Union. Putin is a subscriber to an early 20th century philosophical and political movement called Eurasianism, he said — a creed that rejects Russia’s integration with Europe.

An Ukrainian soldier looks out from a dugout on the frontline with Russia-backed separatists near Verkhnetoretskoye village in the Donetsk region on February 1, 2022. (Anatoli Stepanov/AFP/Getty Images)

Eurasianism died out during communist rule but rebounded in the early 21st century — and Putin has written about it.

“He said this is quasi-religious … the idea that there is sacred soil that exists outside of that, the territorial borders of Russia, and that what you need to do is regain that sacred soil and the ethnic Russians that are on it, whether they want to be part of your state or not,” said Schmidt.

Schmidt said the idea of Putin looking at Ukraine through a nationalist or ethnic-identity lens is one of the most alarming things about the standoff over Ukraine.

It’s also something non-Russians tend to overlook in their eagerness to interpret Putin’s actions and motivations, he said — the possibility that the consequences of invading Ukraine mean little to him in the face of a quasi-religious quest.

“So if that’s driving him, I think all bets are off,” said Schmidt.

A Ukrainian serviceman fires an NLAW anti-tank weapon during an exercise in the Joint Forces Operation in the Donetsk region, eastern Ukraine, on Tuesday. (Vadim Ghirda/The Associated Press)

Russia has said consistently that while it doesn’t intend to invade Ukraine, it wants security guarantees. Moscow has demanded a legally binding promise that Kyiv will never be allowed to join NATO and it wants NATO to roll back its deployments in eastern Europe to 1997 levels.

The threat of imminent invasion has prompted Western countries, including Canada, to scale back and even relocate some embassy operations. Last weekend, Canada withdrew its military training troops from Ukraine after the United States and the United Kingdom shut down their own training courses.

Schmidt said Putin has succeeded in making NATO more relevant than it has been in decades, but the withdrawal of Western training missions has handed him a minor victory inside Ukraine.

“He’s taught the Ukrainians they can’t rely on the West,” said Schmidt. “That is important to prepare the battlefield for what comes next.

“He embarrassed the West and that’s what he wanted.”

Be Prepared: Standing Committee on National Defence

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‘Be Prepared’: Threats and Readiness in an Evolving Security Reality

Former senior diplomat and current Senior Advisor and Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute Colin Robertson was invited to present his views on threats to Canada’s security and the Canadian Armed Forces readiness to meet those threats before the House Standing Committee on National Defence on February 14th. This is a summary of his remarks before the committee.

Colin Robertson

February 14, 2022

In our new Parliament, the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN) will be busy this week examining Threat Analysis Affecting Canada and the CAF Operational Readiness to meet those threats. It’s a mouthful, but as Boy Scouts and Girl Guides will appreciate, it boils down to “Be Prepared”.  A prepared Forces is a prerequisite to Canadian security.

The work of parliamentary committees does not get much notice but their deliberations help build cross-party consensus on public policy, a key to good governance. In their study of operational readiness,  members of the National Defence committee need to keep in mind three overriding considerations: 

First, we need to rethink how we look at security.

It’s been 18 years since we last conducted a national security review and the threats to Canada continue to evolve. A good starting point is the excellent recent CIGI report Reimagining a Canadian National Security Strategy with companion studies that include a look at democracy and disinformation, biosecurity, autonomous weapons and our border with the United States. As to the mechanics of a review, look to the United Kingdom’s recent year-long integrated review of foreign policy, defence, security and international development that sets out a strategic framework for achieving the UK’s national security and international policy objectives between now and 2025. Not only is it comprehensive and costed-out, but it all got done in a year.

Ours is a meaner, messier world. In his address outlining his priorities for 2022, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned that the rules-based multilateral institutions that Canada helped engineer and sustain are not fit for purpose. Polling confirms what we can see and hear: our citizens have less faith in democratic institutions. While the election of Joe Biden has resurrected confidence in US leadership, that trust comes with reservations, especially among Europeans.

The threat index has expanded in recent years to embrace climate change, pandemics, terrorism, poverty and inequality. This devil’s brew accentuates state and inter-state conflicts resulting in more displaced persons than at any time since the Second World War. Conflict itself is changing, with hybrid warfare, untraceable cyberattacks, disinformation, drones and mercenaries. A politically polarized US is less willing and able to carry the internationalist burden. A rising, aggressive China and a revanchist Russia have revived great power rivalry and the ideological and systemic divide between authoritarianism and democracy.

Canada’s strategic culture is of expeditionary forces being sent abroad, through the Boer War, First World War, Second World War, Korean War, with NATO deployments in Europe and multiple peacekeeping operations. In this century, international deployments have included a decade in Afghanistan and more recently in Mali, Iraq, Latvia and Ukraine.

Deployments should be considered through the lens of our national interests and fundamental values. Before making deployments we always need to ask ourselves: what will we gain; what are the risks; what is success; how and when do we get out?

Our national interests are the security of the country and a stable global rules-based order. Our fundamental values start with democracy. To advance our interests and values we enter into collective arrangements, notably NATO, which is currently reviewing its Strategic Concept — for endorsement by leaders at their June summit in Madrid. For what should be there look at the Alphen Group’s recent Shadow Strategic Concept.

Second, our approach to addressing defence modernization is taking far too long to produce useful results.

Operational readiness relies on maintaining and updating our equipment fleet. Government procurement requirements too often handicap industry from getting the job done. The auditor general says our procurement system needs major reform. Other questions persist: given the times and evident increased operational tempo are the budgets sufficient? Are we investing enough in the enablers — digitalization and data management — that will deliver and manage an effective force that can win future wars?

A politically polarized US is less willing and able to carry the internationalist burden. A rising, aggressive China and a revanchist Russia have revived great power rivalry and the ideological and systemic divide between authoritarianism and democracy. 

Operational readiness of our Forces starts with meeting recruitment targets and then ensuring conditions are sufficiently attractive to retain those recruits. We’ve prioritized cultural change to address sexual misconduct. We also need to look at the terms and conditions of service. Let’s think creatively about how we attract, train and grow the kind of talent that can master the technological challenges of our digital age and address new threats like cyber-warfare and disinformation.

We rely on the Forces as first responders to deal with floods, fires and ice-storms and to rescue our long-term care facilities during pandemics. These calls only increase demands on limited resources. Governments — federal, provincial and municipal — should look at creating a corps of volunteers to complement civil defence and disaster relief. The Germans do this well and we should look to them as a model.

Third, changing geopolitics and new threats require a new grand strategy that combines purpose, priorities and budget.

In doing so we need to keep in mind Sir Lawrence Freedman’s characterization of strategy as “an ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essential, to address causes rather than symptoms, to see woods rather than trees.”

Canadian strategy has always revolved around the United States. The sundering of British North America with the American Revolution meant that for the Canadian colonies, the new republic was now the threat. This condition prevailed for most of the next century and a half. The threat of “manifest destiny” enveloping Canada, especially in the wake of the Civil War with the battle-hardened Union Army, was a powerful boost to Confederation, along with the construction of the railroad from coast to coast. While we relied on Britain for defence, the looming American presence drove both our national trade and economic policy and the “open door” immigration policy that settled western Canada.

The great change that turned the US from threat to partner and ally, came with Franklin Roosevelt and Mackenzie King. Subsequent governments built on their scaffolding, enhancing and extending defence and trade agreements. With the removal of the American threat, successive Canadian governments got on with the work of creating a sound economy and political stability at home, necessary prerequisites to playing an active role in international politics.

To balance the preponderant American influence, Canada embraced multilateralism, internationalism, and the rules-based order. Two world wars, involving valour and sacrifice, propelled Canada from colony to nation and thence to a functional middle power. Brilliantly engineered by our diplomats, notably Lester Pearson, Escott Reid, Norman Robertson, and Hume Wrong, the concept of functionalism meant that capacity rather than mere size, should weigh in representation and a voice at the table.

“The golden rule of Canada-US relations is very simple. We can disagree without being disagreeable. The Americans are very important to us. We know they are, notwithstanding the differences, our best ally, our closest neighbour, our biggest customer.”

Balancing the US relationship through active multilateralism has largely guided Canadian foreign policy ever since. In practice, it meant a constant effort to diversify our trade, most recently through the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), while ensuring continued access to the US market with the recent renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), reincarnated as the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). It has also meant finding niches, such as peacekeeping and human security, where we could be the helpful fixer or a bridge with the developing world through, for example, active leadership in the Commonwealth and Francophonie, where the US was not present.

Secure under the US defence shield through NATO and NORAD, and with access to the US market, our grand strategy, balancing the US and multilateralism, mostly worked. Much depended on the vigour and commitment of prime ministers. Brian Mulroney, who mastered the balancing act, captured the practical effect of this strategy:

“The golden rule of Canada-US relations is very simple. We can disagree without being disagreeable. The Americans are very important to us. We know they are, notwithstanding the differences, our best ally, our closest neighbour, our biggest customer. There is also a rule of global politics – Canada’s influence in the world is measured to a significant degree by the extent to which we are perceived as having real influence in Washington.”

New threats and changing geopolitics – a less reliable USA, ineffective multilateralism and a broken rules-based order — now obliges us to re-examine and re-think our grand strategy.

At a minimum, the insurance premiums for national security have gone up. We are going to have to find more money for defence and also for the civil instruments of national security. This means more investment in diplomacy, development and in communicating abroad our messages on democracy, multilateralism, and the rules-based order. Military power wins battle but to win wars in today’s world requires both hard power and soft power. In our meaner, messier world Canada needs more of each.

In 2014, NATO governments, including Canada, pledged to meet a target of two percent defence spending by 2024. According to NATO, Canada currently spends 1.39 percent, outpaced by NATO G7 partners the United Kingdom (2.29 percent), the United States (3.52 precent), France (2.01 percent), Germany (1.53 percent) and Italy (1.41 precent).

In terms of development assistance at 0.31 percent of GDP, Canada is also a long way from the 0.7 percent UN target, outpaced again by our G7 partners: the United Kingdom (0.7 percent), Germany (0.73 percent) and France (0.53percent).

We took advantage of the end of the Cold War to reduce defence budgets, confident that we could continue to rely on the American security umbrella. The Americans are fed up with carrying the load and successive presidents have challenged us to do more, especially now that it’s time for NORAD renewal. We claim sovereignty over our Arctic but struggle to exercise it. We need a budgeted blueprint with deadlines. We can learn a lot from Nordic partners like Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. What will the role of NATO be now that the Arctic is part of the geo-strategic chessboard?

As a trading nation, we depend on freedom of navigation. As a maritime nation fronting on three oceans, we need to ask ourselves whether we have the balance right among our Army, Air Force and Navy. We don’t necessarily have too much Army or Air Force, but we do need more Navy. Our potential adversaries are investing significantly in their navies, especially in the Indo-Pacific. So must we. The new offshore patrol ships perform an important role. But a deployable, combat-capable Navy requires destroyers, frigates, submarines, with air and logistic support.

Military power wins battle but to win wars in today’s world requires both hard power and soft power. In our meaner, messier world Canada needs more of each.

Investing in operational readiness only when we feel pressed and then doing so on the cheap undermines our national interests. Without an overarching strategy and shared cross-party view of our national interest and how to go about advancing and protecting it, we will continue to be late, unprepared and obliged to follow rather than lead.

Parliamentary committees are the unseen and mostly unappreciated workhorses of democratic government. In the new information age where tweets and soundbites move narratives, considered cross-party discussion, drawing on expert testimony, gets little attention. But these hearings and committee discussions behind closed doors do a lot to inform and educate legislators. They also help them come together in support of the national interest.

In an era of hybrid warfare, gray zones and twilight struggles, developing cross-party unity on our security and defence strategy and requirements is essential to sustain support through changes of government. It is the only way we can be sure our Forces will achieve the operational readiness necessary to support our values and national interests.

Contributing Writer Colin Robertson, a former Canadian foreign affairs officer who served in Washington, New York and Los Angeles, is senior advisor and fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Ottawa. This article is adapted from a presentation to the Defence Committee of the House of Commons, February 14, 2022.